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Abstract
Segmentation and Model Generation for Large-Scale Cyber Attacks
Steven E. Strapp
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Raw Cyber attack traffic can present more questions than answers to security analysts. Es-
pecially with large-scale observables it is difficult to identify which packets are relevant
and what attack behaviors are present. Many existing works in Host or Flow Clustering at-
tempt to group similar behaviors to expedite analysis; these works often phrase the problem
directly as offline unsupervised machine learning. This work proposes online processing to
simultaneously model coordinating actors and segment traffic that is relevant to a target of
interest, all while it is being received. The goal is not just to aggregate similar attack behav-
iors, but to provide situational awareness by grouping potential coordinators and isolating
an attack area of interest around a particular target. The clustering problem is recast as a
supervised learning problem: classifying received traffic to the most likely attack model,
and iteratively introducing new attack models to explain received traffic. A novel graphical
prior probability is defined based on the macroscopic attack structure to improve classi-
fication. Malicious traffic captures provided by the Cooperative Association for Internet
Data Analysis are used to demonstrate the accuracy of the online model generation and
segmentation.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
High-profile cyber attack targets often receive large-scale malicious traffic with many di-
verse behaviors from many sources. Protecting these resources is contingent on analysts’
ability to understand and quickly interpret the received traffic. Understanding received
traffic, however, is a multi-step process: first, the traffic of interest must be isolated from
a possibly large capture of all traffic, and then it must be understood as different attack
behaviors.
The problem extends beyond understanding only the traffic incident on the target of in-
terest as well; traffic emitted by the attack sources to other destinations may also be critical
to understanding the attack behavior, in addition to traffic from other sources observed at
other attack targets, and possibly even traffic further removed from the target of interest.
Succinctly, packets several hops from the target of interest may be critical to analysis. A
simple example which argues for considering traffic more hops away from the target of
interest may be differentiating random scanning from a dedicated probe. If a source sends
malicious reconnaissance traffic to the target of interest, the severity of this action may be
impacted by this sources behaviors with regard to other nodes: if identical reconnaissance
traffic is sent to hundreds of other addresses, this traffic may simply be random scanning,
whereas if the target of interest is the only address targeted this may be a more severe, and
dedicated, attempt to compromise the target of interest.
Unfortunately, characteristics of malicious IP traffic further intensify this problem. For
example, IP address “spoofing” is a routine malicious behavior [14, 18], where the source
IP addresses of malicious packets are fabricated. If it is not necessary for an attack behavior
to observe return traffic, address spoofing is a valuable obfuscation tool. However, from
an analyst’s perspective this common behavior greatly diminishes the reliability of source
IP address as a feature: a single malicious host may utilize many addresses, and multiple
malicious activities may probabilistically, and inadvertently, spoof the same address. Al-
ternatively, given the high volumes of malicious traffic likely at a high-profile target, either
sophisticated or due to simple Malware, probabilistic intersection of different attack be-
haviors at a target is also likely. Many independent attack behaviors may target the same
destination address or be emitted from the same source address, significantly intensifying
analysis.
21.1 Graphical Representation
Existing works utilize a graphical representation of cyber attack traffic, either as a bipartite
graph [7] or a digraph [3] showing directed traffic from sources to destinations. In par-
ticular, Du and Yang [3] denote the directed graphical representation as an “Attack Social
Graph”, where the “social” terminology alludes to the graphical structure implying a “so-
cial” relationship between nodes, as in the field of Social Network Analysis. In this case,
even a trivial graphical representation can exemplify the probabilistic intersection problem
and motivate the need for a complex segmentation and modeling framework. A small set
of cyber attack traffic, shown in Table 1.1, is used to construct the digraph in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.1 includes both the obfuscated source and destination IP addresses, which are used
to create the graphical representation, and other packet header information which provides
a basic understanding about the attack behavior.
Table 1.1: Example Malicious Traffic
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
2004767786 8469562 UDP 1949 63238
2004767786 109436860 UDP 2138 36837
2004767786 8469562 UDP 4293 63238
2004767786 8469562 UDP 3848 63238
992229748 8469562 UDP 1349 59166
992229748 8469562 UDP 1353 59166
3683179528 8469562 UDP 1212 59166
2103156483 8469562 UDP 2239 59166
The ground truth of the attack behaviors in this brief capture is unknown, but the des-
tination port behavior does prompt questions about the true connectivity of traffic around
destination address 8469562. For example, three of the malicious sources that generate
traffic to 8469562 target the same destination service, though source 2004767786 does
not. It is difficult to infer with so few packets, but there also seems to be a disparity in
packet rate between 2004767786 and the other malicious sources. Possibly, there are two
independent attack behaviors incident on target address 8469562 that should be modeled
separately. Additionally, source 2004767786 also seems to utilize different packet rate and
destination port behaviors with the two destinations it targets; possibly this is a result of two
independent attack behaviors spoofing the same source address. From the perspective of
address 8469562 the traffic incident from source 2004767786 is of interest, but the behav-
ior with different characteristics that is incident on address 109436860 may be irrelevant
and should be segmented from analysis; conversely, if source 2004767786 generated traffic
to other targets with characteristics similar to the traffic to 8469562 the other targets may
also be of interest.
To exhibit the severity of the probabilistic intersection problem, Figure 1.2 shows a
much more complex attack social graph. A target of interest address was randomly selected
and all traffic within six hops from the target of interest and within a five minute window
was used to create the attack social graph shown. The attack social graph has interesting
3Figure 1.1: A Graphical Representation of the Traffic in Table 1.1
structure: there are many dense “rings” or “fans” of source or target addresses, with a few
sparse connections in between.
The dense “rings”, like the component in the center of the graph, or “fans” like along the
bottom and right of the attack social graph, have two likely explanations, given the number
of sources involved. Possibly this is a “botnet”: a group of personal computers that have
been compromised and sold. After purchase these computers can be remotely controlled by
a leader. However, given the prevalence of these graph structures, it is much more likely that
these source addresses are simply spoofed addresses of a single attack behavior. If an attack
probabilistically fabricates a source address for each packet, it will give the appearance
that many nodes are participating in the attack. The address spoofing interpretation also
explains the sparsity of the connections between groups. Two independent attacks may
inadvertently spoof the same address, and this spoofed address will appear as a single,
sparse tie between spoofed address clusters.
One final attack social graph example is shown in Figure 1.3. Looking at the packets
associated with the graph in Figure 1.1 it was inferred that possibly there were multiple in-
dependent attack behaviors present, however, that example should not give the impression
that packet-level information exclusively is able to isolate different attack behaviors. A re-
lated set of works in Host Clustering infer groupings of similar malicious sources, or edges,
based on packet-level features. Figure 1.3, illustrates a possible, undesired consequence of
utilizing exclusively packet-level information. Both of the clusters of nodes circled in red
are TCP traffic on port 4662, which is used by the OrbitNet Message Service, which has
known vulnerabilities [1]. Given that this service has known vulnerabilities, it is likely that
multiple different attack behaviors may perform reconnaissance, searching for computers
running this service. However, based on the structure of this attack social graph it is very
unlikely that all of the nodes circled in red are part of the same attack behavior: they are
disconnected and far apart in the attack social graph. An appreciable improvement to the
clustering strategy is to include graphical information in addition to packet-level features.
4Figure 1.2: A More Complex Graphical Representation
5Figure 1.3: An Example of Disconnected, Similar Behaviors
6The processing presented in this work focuses on resolving the uncertainty present in
malicious traffic where probabilistic intersection is common. Prior works consider the
problem of clustering hosts with similar features, and this work expands the problem def-
inition to treat the problem of grouping elements from the same attack behavior and plau-
sible collaborators. In addition the problem definition is expanded to include the task of
excluding traffic that joins these collaborators probabilistically. Concisely, the sub-tasks
treated under the broad umbrella of helping to resolve the uncertainty in malicious traffic
are enumerated below:
• The unsupervised learning approaches employed to perform host clustering should
be adapted to provide online awareness about attack behaviors
• The task of clustering similar behaviors should also be adapted to instead group traffic
likely generated by the same attack behavior; the assignment of traffic to groups
should reflect both the packet-level features of the traffic and also the surrounding
graph structure
• Traffic many hops from the target of interest may be important to analysis, the correct
extent of analysis must be determined as traffic is incident
• In an environment where probabilistic intersection is common, traffic that is proba-
bilistically connected and not relevant to analysis should be removed, or segmented,
to clarify analysis
The end achievement is an online system that can isolate a relevant subset of received
traffic and divide this received traffic into empirically constructed attack models, with the
objective of providing situational awareness to security analysts.
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Related Works
Uncertainly about the association of address to attack behavior models is the motivating
problem for many Host Clustering works. Given a large set of malicious hosts, the objective
of Host Clustering is to create groupings based on the features of these hosts, and to assign
each host to the most similar group. In principle, this problem statement is similar to the
goal of grouping collaborating hosts in an attack social graph. Host clustering methods,
discussed in section 2.1 provide a reference point for the task of grouping similar attack
behaviors into models, but notably fails to address the problem of segmenting irrelevant,
probabilistically attached behaviors or determining the correct scope of traffic to consider.
Host clustering also routinely treats the group problem as unsupervised machine learning,
which is sub-optimal for an online approach, as discussed in subsection 2.2.
2.1 Host Clustering
Host Clustering typically phrases the analysis problem of grouping observed data into at-
tack models directly as an unsupervised machine learning problem. Various Host Clus-
tering works define a broad spectrum of possible feature sets, and each host address is
represented as a point in this feature space. An unsupervised learning method is then ap-
plied to empirically produce clusters of behavior, and associate the host points to the most
similar cluster. A wide variety of methods are also employed including: agglomerative
clustering methods [5, 10, 19], spectral clustering [20], divisive clustering [3], and prin-
ciple component analysis followed by manual labeling in the principle component space
[4].
Despite the wide variety in methods, there are significant commonalities in the Host
Clustering approaches. At the lowest level, the approach is similar: define a set of features
from the observed traffic, and then cluster the points in this feature space. An obvious,
but implicit, assumption with this approach is that traffic which behaves similarly should
be clustered together. This is, however, a departure from the goal of isolating traffic from
the same attack behavior. For example, Figure 2.1, again, provides an example where two
instances of the same attack behavior, circled in red, are present at disjoint locations in the
attack social graph. Presumably, the two red sets of similar packets are two independent
attack behaviors that coincidentally both attempt to exploit the same known vulnerability.
8Figure 2.1: An Example of Disconnected, Similar Behaviors
For an online framework, the goal of clustering or modeling is not just to group sim-
ilar behaviors for later analysis, but to determine which addresses collaborate and there-
fore should have their behaviors interpreted together. The goal is to provide situational
awareness, which is subtly different than clustering behaviors for later analysis. Provid-
ing situational awareness is a combination of assessing the relevant attack behaviors being
experienced, retaining only these behaviors, and then inferring collaborating groups of ad-
dresses, whether authentic or spoofed.
In the spirit of providing situational awareness and gauging the collaboration between
actors, the attack social graph also provides valuable macroscopic information that is not
9fully captured by Host Clustering. Multiple Host Clustering works appreciate the impor-
tance of graphical features, but utilize only packet based features. For example, [3, 4,
20] all define clustering features based on source in-degree or target out-degree, which
does incorporate a graphical interpretation, but is still microscopic edge-level information.
Macroscopic information about the attack social graph is valuable for deducing collabo-
ration and grouping cooperating addresses: for example, if two source address both emit
traffic to the same target, possibly they collaborate or possibly this is probabilistic. How-
ever, if this same pair of sources emits traffic to two or more common targets, it is even
more likely they collaborate. Conversely, if two sources emit traffic that is similar under
some features, but they are distant in the attack social graph, it is much less likely that they
collaborate. Macroscopic information about the attack social graph is a key component to
improving on an exclusively feature-based approach.
A final caveat about graphical packet-level features, like node degree, is the sensitiv-
ity to the address spoofing and probabilistic intersection introduced earlier. For spoofed-
address traffic in-degree loses much of its significance, and actually introduces artifacts.
If an attack randomly spoofs every source address, the out-degree of the source and in-
degree of its targets are more a function of the traffic rate than the number of hosts that
are collaborating against this target. Similarly, in-degree is a misleading feature if the dif-
ferent incident edges are from different attack behaviors. For example, Du and Yang [3]
cite that the clustering result obtained is significantly perturbed by a single special source
with massive out-degree. All targets in one of the dendrogram branches have a special
conspirator with very high out-degree: possibly just a fast random scanner. The fact that
these addresses are all targeted by the same scanner has no bearing on their similarity; they
were targeted probabilistically by a single stochastic behavior, however, this behavior was
distant enough in the feature space to pull many dissimilar sources into the same cluster.
Wei, Mirkovic, and Kissel [19] and Xu, Zhang, and Bhattacharyya [21] treat IP address
even more directly, which induces similar risk in the presence of probabilistic intersection.
A system which provides accurate situational awareness must not rely on the authenticity
of IP addresses or implicitly assume that all traffic incident on a target or emitted from a
source is collaborating.
2.2 Unsupervised Learning
Many of the unsupervised learning techniques applied, agglomerative clustering, divisive
clustering, spectral clustering, and principle component analysis (PCA), are also poorly
suited to an online system. As described for the host clustering problem, these methods
take as input a set of points in a feature space, and then cluster, or in the case of PCA,
simplify the representation of these points. For an online system, however, the set of input
points is continually growing as new traffic is received, and for a system that segments
irrelevant behaviors, existing traffic may also be removed. One possibility for an iterative
approach is to just run a standard unsupervised algorithm in batches: if the set of data points
has changed by a sufficient amount, re-run the clustering processing. Other methods exist
[2] which average results between batches or use gradient based approximations to avoid
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multiple passes over the data-set.
Unfortunately, there is another aspect to the unsupervised learning problem that further
complicates the issue of iterative updates. Agglomerative clustering algorithms like the
iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm defined by Cappe´ and Moulines [2] or
the vanilla EM or K-Means algorithms [6] require a specification of the number of clusters
to produce. Even algorithms without this requirement like X-means, as employed by Gu et
al. [5], avoid an explicit specification of the number of clusters only by experimenting with
different hypothetical numbers of clusters and validating. This methodology significantly
intensifies the iterative dilemma. Nested levels of iteration result: as new data is incident,
a new number of clusters may be appropriate, so with each addition or batch of additions
different numbers of clusters must be tried and validated. As a result, the Attack Segmenta-
tion and Model Generation (ASMG) processing designed abandons the unsupervised point
of view and recasts the same objective as a supervised learning problem.
11
Chapter 3
Attack Segmentation and Model Generation
The Attack Segmentation and Model Generation processing (ASMG) developed was mo-
tivated by a desire to provide online situational awareness to security analysts: to assess
the subset of traffic relevant to a target of interest as it is incident, and to model this traffic
into likely coordinating groups. The definition of an attack model is similar in concept to a
cluster in previous Host Clustering works, but deviates significantly in its intention. An at-
tack model produced by the ASMG processing is not just a description of source addresses
that generate similar traffic or with similar characteristics, it is a model of a single attack
behavior produced by collaborating hosts or spoofed addresses of these malicious hosts.
This objective drives the two principle design decisions of the ASMG: the processing
must be performed online as new traffic is incident, and macroscopic information about the
attack social graph must be captured to distinguish between likely collaborating addresses
and addresses that simply behave similarly. Finally, these objectives are all set in an at-
tack environment where probabilistic intersection between sources or targets is routine.
This environment drives a need to segment irrelevant behaviors that are probabilistically
attached to the attack social graph of interest, and also drives the attack features away from
incorporating IP address or its derivatives, like node degree.
3.1 Overview
Figure 3.1 presents a top-level diagram of the system components. The diagram immedi-
ately suggests that the unsupervised learning problem treated by host-clustering has been
recast into a supervised learning, or classification, problem. The principle components of
the top-level diagram are enumerated and described below:
Non-Parametric Attack Models The ASMG maintains a series of empirically constructed
non-parametric attack models, that are created online from the observed traffic; as
new traffic is incident on the current attack social graph of interest it is classified to
the attack model that maximizes the posterior probability.
Graph-Based Prior Probability A graph-based prior probability is defined and calcu-
lated for each attack model, then posterior probability is calculated similar to a routine
Naı¨ve Bayes classifier. However, the graphical prior is a significant departure from
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the frequentist prior in routine Naı¨ve Bayes classification; it utilizes macroscopic in-
formation about the attack social graph to evaluate the probability of an attack model
prior to considering the packet level features.
Model Intorduction Processing The middle branch of the top-level tree is the model in-
troduction processing: given that a set of attack models already exists, new pack-
ets can be classified to the maximum a posteriori attack model; however, if none of
the existing models provide a probable explanation for this new traffic, a new attack
model should be introduced.
Generic Attack Model This procedure is controlled by a Generic Attack Model, an addi-
tional hypothesis to the set of existing empirically constructed models. The generic
attack model is specified offline based on domain knowledge, and is conceptually a
“jack of all trades, master of none”: a model that intends to fit all attack behaviors
with modest probability, but not as well as a tailored empirical model. When new
traffic is observed, the generic model is evaluated as another possible class, and if
this general model has higher posterior probability than any of the existing models,
it is a clear indication that none of the existing attack models provide a probable
explanation, and a new model should be introduced.
Segmentation Processing Finally, the right branch of the top-level diagram treats the seg-
mentation processing and the evaluation of whether or not attack models are relevant
to the target of interest.
Figure 3.1: ASMG Top-Level Diagram
A precise definition of the term “Attack Model”, and the construction of attack mod-
els from received packets is treated in subsection 3.2. The graphical prior probability is
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discussed in subsection 3.3, and subsection 3.4 includes a description of how the generic
model is used as a threshold for introducing new models and the procedure for creating
new models. Finally, subsection 3.5 details how the relevant and irrelevant attack social
graph components are determined, and outlines the segmentation procedure.
3.2 Attack Model Definition
“Attack Model” is an ubiquitous term in cyber security literature, with various different
interpretations. In the context of ASMG an attack model is defined as a collection of feature







Each attack model maintains a non-parametric probability distribution on each of these fea-
tures. The choice of non-parametric distribution estimates in critical, since they can easily
be created and updated online, without continually reestimating parameters; in addition,
for some features the correct parametric form is inobvious.
3.2.1 Protocol
Protocol is a simple discrete feature, which can be used to illustrate how the distributions
are constructed and maintained. Discrete features can be modeled non-parametrically with
a histogram. Figure 3.2 shows an example probability distribution for protocol after receiv-
ing four packets. The first packet received is TCP, and at this instant this attack model can
only assume that TCP traffic occurs with probability 1.0, and no other traffic is generated by
this behavior. As a second, UDP, packet is received, both TCP and UDP look equiprobable.
As additional packets are received, TCP traffic becomes the dominate protocol hypothesis,
but UDP traffic is still possible with modest probability.
This simple example highlights that with a small number of samples the feature dis-
tributions are volatile, but as additional observations are incremented the distribution will
become a much more stable approximation for the true probabilities, as in the Law of
Large Numbers. The probability of the protocol random variable, P , taking value x, can
be estimated simply by counting the occurrences of x, versus counting the total number of
observations. This is summarized simply in 3.1, where x1 . . . xN are the observed model
samples. Ix(i) is the indicator function; the numerator term only accumulates the occur-
rences of x.
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Figure 3.2: Feature Protocol Distribution Example






ICMP-type is a similar discrete feature that can also be modeled non-parametrically with
a histogram, and of course only packets using the ICMP protocol will have observables on
this feature. Similarly, only UDP or TCP packets will have observations on the Source and
Destination Port features.
ICMP packets can be used for a variety of malicious actions, particularly reconnais-
sance. Most simply, echo and echo reply type messages can be used to scan if a host is
live, but combinations of echo and other information request messages can also be used
for operating system fingerprinting. Knowledge about the operating system type is a crit-
ical element when developing an intrusion strategy. ICMP packets can also be used to
determine the network topology or to detect access control list filtering or packet filtering
[16]. Knowledge about the type of ICMP packets is an important feature in differentiating
reconnaissance behaviors.
3.2.3 Source and Destination Port
The treatment of source and destination ports is more complex than in many existing works.
Cyber attack traffic exhibits many different source and destination port selection behaviors.
The simplest case is a deterministic selection; like the profile for legitimate traffic, packets
are sent from a certain port on the source machine to a particular port on the destination
machine. In the malicious case this likely indicates a particular service is being targeted,
and that the return traffic is of interest. In this case, the port values can directly be compared
to gauge the similarity of attack behaviors; however, there are also a variety of stochastic
behaviors that are less obvious to treat. For example, a malicious source may perform
a “vertical” scan over many different destination ports. Whereas, some attacks may ran-
domly select source ports to obscure the behavior profile. “Backscatter” traffic commonly
generated from denial of service attacks [18, 22, 15] may also give the appearance of ran-
domly selecting destination port. For stochastic port selections a comparison of the actual
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port values is not meaningful, and given the commonality of non-deterministic behaviors,
a more complex model was adopted for the source and destination port features.
The probability of the port random variable, P , taking a particular value X is given
by (3.2), where P (D) is the probability of a deterministic port selection and P (S) is the
probability of a stochastic port selection. P (D) and P (S) are estimated separately for the
source and destination ports, and together fill the hypothesis space for a discretized repre-
sentation of entropy on the source and destination port selections. In that sense, (3.2) is
just a statement of the law of total probability. By further applying the intuition that the
actual numeric port value is only important if the port is chosen deterministically, (3.2) is
reduced to (3.3). If the source or destination port is chosen deliberately and deterministi-
cally, a comparison of the numeric port value is appropriate, whereas if the port is chosen
randomly any value is equiprobable.
P (P = X) = P (P = X|S)P (S) + P (P = X|D)P (D) (3.2)
P (P = X) = P (S) + P (P = X)P (D) (3.3)
P (D) and P (S) are estimated with Statistical Bootstrapping: randomly sampling sub-
sets with replacement from the total set of observed samples, and counting the fraction of
subsets that are deterministic, and include only one value, and the fraction of subsets that
are stochastic, and include many values.
3.2.4 Graph-Position
Finally, the graph-position feature is a first attempt at incorporating graphical structure into
the segmentation and model generation framework. The graph-position feature is defined
very similarly to the graphical prior probability discussed in subsection 3.3. The intuition
defining this feature is that the nodes in the attack social graph associated to an attack
model should have similar “position” or “roles” in the graph. Mathematically, this feature
is based on the concept of closeness centrality in Social Network Analysis [13], and the
related concept of Graph Efficiency [8]. The closeness of a node is given by (3.4): the







The graph-position feature, however, only accounts for the nodes assigned to the attack
model being evaluated, and therefore the sum in (3.4) is not unweighted: nodes belonging
to the attack model being evaluated with high probability should contribute significantly
more weight. Conceptually, nodes that are not part of the same attack model are discon-
nected.
Given Pi,j as the path from nodes i to j; the distance along this path is defined by the






P (M |k) (3.5)
The graph-position feature for a node, i, is calculated by (3.7). As before, let Pi,j be the
path from node i to j, and Pki,j be the kth edge along the path. The sum of reciprocals is re-
tained from the Closeness Centrality and Graph Efficiency formulas, but the distance of the
path is weighted to reflect the model probabilities. Finally, the summation is weighted by
the probability of the terminal edges of the path: the closeness calculation should be most
















One additional consideration with the graph position feature is that this feature prob-
ability distribution is continuous, but still must be constructed empirically, online. The
continuous analogy of a histogram, is a kernel density estimator. A continuous probabil-
ity distribution is modeled by superimposing kernel functions at each of the observed data
points to produce an estimated density. The equation for a kernel density estimate is given
by (3.8), whereK is the kernel function and h is a smoothing parameter. The Epanechnikov
kernel was used as it is computationally preferable to a non-finite support Gaussian, and










A final subtle point is that the quantity produced by a kernel density estimate is a proba-
bility density; not a probability value. Though these may be somewhat synonymous collo-
quially the likelihood calculation requires the probability of a received sample; the proba-
bility density does not meet the requirements of a probability, for example it may by larger
than one. Appendix A addresses this subtlety, with the principle conclusion being that as
long as density is compared between different hypotheses, in this case between the attack
models, it may be regarded as probability.
3.2.5 Likelihood Calculation
The feature probability distributions in Figure 3.3 act as a small example for calculating
the likelihood of a new packet for a given attack model. Figure 3.3 describes a hypothetical
attack model for an attack behaviors generating HTTP TCP traffic.
Next, a new packet is observed with features described in Table 3.1; similar to the
attack model distributions this packet is also TCP sent to destination port 80. The large
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Figure 3.3: Example Attack Model Distributions
majority of packets in the attack model are TCP, so the TCP value on the new packet
has likelihood 0.900. The likelihood of the destination port value of 80 is determined
based on the summation of the stochastic term and the deterministic term. The attack
model destination port discrete entropy distribution shows only deterministic behavior, and
in the calculation of the likelihood for the new packet the stochastic term contributes zero
probability. The deterministic term contributes probability one, since the attack distribution
models an entirely deterministic behavior, and port 80 is used both exclusively by the attack
model and the new packet.
When calculating the source port likelihood both the deterministic and stochastic terms
contribute some probability. The attack model describes a mostly stochastic behavior, but
there is a small probability of deterministic behavior. This may indicate a small bias for
particular port value, or a consequence of the bootstrap sampling method used. The sum
of the stochastic term (0.96) and deterministic term, multiplied with the probability of port
12017, (0.0012), produces a probability estimate of 0.961. As discussed, in Appendix
A the graph position feature provides a probability density, which is proportional to the
probability.
The likelihood of the new packet is determined by the product of the individual attack
model feature likelihood values, as with Naı¨ve Bayes classification. One final consideration




Destination Port 80 0.00 + 1.0 * 1.0 = 1.000
Source Port 12017 0.96 + 0.04 * 0.03 = 0.961
Graph Position 0.4573 ∝ fgp(0.4573)
Table 3.1: Hypothetical New Packet to Classify
synonyms colloquially, though in statistics “likelihood” is often reserved strictly for a func-
tion of a parameter random variable, given a fixed set of observations, and “probability” is
reserved for a function of a random sample and a fixed parameter value. However, given
an example parameter θ, the likelihood and probability are related by L(θ|X) = P (X|θ).
This relationship justified the terminology “likelihood” for the P (X|M) term.
In summary, the attack models defined are a collection of empirically constructed proba-
bility density estimates for the features defined. Together these feature distributions provide
the likelihood term for calculating the posterior in Bayes’ Rule, shown in (3.9). For each
new packet incident on the attack social graph of interest the feature values described are
extracted and represented as an observation vector X. The goal of the Naı¨ve Bayes clas-
sification is to determine the probability of each model after receiving this new evidence;
based both on the likelihood of the feature values, and the prior probability of the attack
model before observing the packet features.
P (M |X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
= P (X|M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
P (M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior
(3.9)
3.3 Graphical Prior Probability
The posterior probability calculation is equally dependent on two factors: the likelihood
of the observed feature values given the attack model feature distributions, and also the
prior probability of the attack model. The unsupervised problem defined in Host Clus-
tering does not consider the probability of the attack models themselves: the objective
function for clustering is based solely on maximizing the likelihood of the observed data.
A shortcoming of this strategy is that the macroscopic graphical information is ignored:
any observables that have similar features will belong to the same cluster. For the objective
of inferring collaborating groups at a target of interest this is insufficient, and the graphical
structure should be considered.
Many possible scenarios exist for collaboration in cyber attack traffic; as alluded to
earlier, IP addresses that appear to collaborate may just be spoofed addresses from a single
host. Alternatively, collaborating addresses may be a group of hackers working together
to accomplish a malicious objective. Another hypothesis is that these could be different
machines in a “botnet” commanded by a leading hacker. Regardless of the ground truth,
all of these possible scenarios imply calculated behavior to target a particular resource or
set of resources. IP addresses that collaborate are presumably concentrated, not randomly
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distributed throughout the attack social graph. The prior probability of an attack model is
indicated by how centralized the attack social graph components are, even before observing
the packet-level features on those components. An example case of a high-probability and
low-probability attack model are shown in Figure 3.4; the characteristics that make the
left model probable and the right model improbable are clear even without observing the
packet-level features.
Figure 3.4: Graphical Prior Probability Example
The edges hypothetically assigned to the attack model are shown with dotted lines; in
the left attack social graph the attack model edges are centralized around a particular target
in the bottom right, while in the right graph the attack model edges are distributed through-
out the graph. Intuitively, the left graph is a probable attack structure, since the malicious
sources are collaborating against a single target. The right graph shows the attack model
edges randomly dispersed throughout the graph; there is not a plausible attack objective in
this case, the efforts of the attack are randomly distributed. A random distribution of edge
is not a probable attack behavior for a sophisticated group of attackers collaborating, for a
botnet, or even for spoofed-address traffic.
Graph Efficiency
Mathematically, this intuition is captured by the measure of Graph Efficiency defined by
Latora and Marchiori [8]. This is very similar to the concept of Closeness Centrality used to
define the packet-level graph-position feature, but is an extrapolation to measure the entire









As with the graph position feature, the distance of each pair of nodes in the attack social
graph is defined by the inverse probability of the attack model M , being evaluated. Also,
in this case, the entire attack social graph likely does not belong to the attack model being
evaluated, and the premultiplier in (3.10), based on the number of nodes in the graph, N ,
is not appropriate. Instead, the weighting is moved into the summation, and based on the
probability of the two nodes being considered. The contribution of the distance between
a pair of nodes is determined by the probability that both the starting and terminal edges
belong toM . If a path begins or ends at a node that belongs toM with very low probability,
the path should not significantly impact the efficiency of the attack social graph for model
M , since it does not belong to that model. Whereas, if both the beginning and terminal
edge of a path belong to model M with high probability, this path is a significant factor
in determining the efficiency of the graph, and should be weighted heavily. With these








Equation 3.12 expands the distance calculation between nodes, where Pi,j signifies the
path between the current pair or nodes, i and j, in the outer summation, and Pki,j is the kth










Weighting by the probability of each edge along the path, however, removes a clear bound
on the range of values for the graph efficiency, and without normalization the efficiency
values on each attack social graph are not a valid probability distribution. Instead, the
prior probability of each attack model, P (M), is derived by normalizing over the set of all
current attack models. Letting Mall be the current set of attack models, the prior probability






By combining the feature probability distributions that define an attack model and the
graphical prior probability, the posterior probability can be calculated for each observed
packet for each attack model: the probability using both prior intuition and the observed
evidence. Bayes Rule, stated in (3.9), defines the posterior probability of the packet as the
product of the likelihood and prior terms. As with normal supervised classification, each
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packet is assigned to the attack model that maximizes the posterior probability. The process
of assigning observed packets to attack models is summerized by (3.14).
Assigned Model = argmaxMi∈MallP (X|Mi)P (Mi) (3.14)
The classification process is not as routine as it may appear however, since the attack
model distributions are defined based on the samples assigned to the model. In the sense
that the framework iteratively classifies new packets, updates the model distributions, then
repeats, it is similar to the Expectation Maximization algorithm. However, the inclusion of
a graph-based prior probability is both novel and necessary; incorporation of the graphical
structure is essential to the goal of grouping collaborating actors, as opposed to clustering
similar behaviors.
Edge Posterior Probability
In addition to determining the posterior probability of received packets so that they can be
associated to the maximum a posteriori attack model, the graphical prior probability, graph
position feature and segmentation processing all utilize the posterior probability of edges
in the attack social graph when determining distances between nodes. The edge posterior
probability is calculated as the product of the posterior probabilities for each packet on
that edge. Intuitively, individual packet probabilities should be incorporated with some
combining processing to produce the edge probability; the choice of a product results from
the assumption that each packet is an independent observation on the edge behavior. The
probability of multiple event occurring is a product of the probability for each event, given
the assumption of independence, as in (3.15).
P (M |E) =
∏
Xi∈E
P (M |Xi) (3.15)
However, for numerical stability, this product of probabilities is often calculated as a
sum of log probabilities, as in (3.16).







3.4 Model Introduction Strategy
Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 define a classification strategy for associating new observed packets
with a set of attack models to maximize the posterior probability. This, of course, prompts
questions about constructing the initial set of attack models, or alternatively, how to treat
new behaviors that are not well explained by any of the existing attack models. This is
really a restatement of the same caveat present in unsupervised learning: how many attack
models are appropriate?
Intuitively, if the posterior probability of new observed packets is low for all attack mod-
els in the current set, a new attack model should be created; the new packets clearly have a
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different behavior than what has been seen before. A naı¨ve approach is to impose a fixed
threshold on the posterior probability. If the posterior probability of even the most likely
model is less than some threshold, τ , then a new attack model should be created. How-
ever, without ground truth, it is difficult to evaluate an appropriate choice for τ , especially
given the wide variation in attack behaviors and attack graph structures between different
targets of interest. Judging the performance of a particular threshold value is particularly
subjective, and a more robust alternative is adopted.
3.4.1 Generic Model
Instead of asserting a scalar value, another hypothesis is defined to compete against the
empirically-construct attack models during the classification phase. This new hypothesis
is denoted the “Generic Model” which intends to fit all behaviors with some modest prob-
ability. The feature distributions for the generic model are defined based on prior analysis
of the type of traffic considered [9], or based on intuition about the features defined. Figure
3.5 shows the generic model feature distributions used; the protocol, source and destination
port, and ICMP-type distributions are drawn from prior analysis performed by Lee, Car-
penter, and Brownlee [9]. The protocol distribution reflects a majority of TCP traffic, with
more modest amounts of UDP and ICMP traffic. The ICMP-type distribution exhibits a
bias for the types used for reconnaissance as described by Tan [16]: echo, echo reply, desti-
nation unreachable and time exceeded. The most probable values for the port distributions
are composed of commonly exploited services: MySQL server, Windows share, NetBIOS,
SSH, etc.
The graph-position feature distribution, and port discrete entropy distributions are se-
lected to be uniform across the feature space. For the entropy hypothesis the most general
conclusion is an equal probability of deterministic and stochastic behaviors. The values for
the graph position feature, since it is an inverse of distances, is bounded between zero and
one; the probability density is chosen to be uniform across this range.
Conceptually this model is an aggregate of all attack behaviors: a “jack of all trades,
master of none”. Based on these general feature distributions, and the same prior probabil-
ity calculation defined for the other attack models, the posterior probability of the generic
model can be calculated and considered alongside the other empirical hypotheses.
The generic model intends to fit all attack behaviors with some modest probability, but
certainly will not be as probable as an attack model tailor-made for a specific attack be-
havior. Instead, the generic model acts as a more intuitive threshold for introducing attack
models. After a new observation is classified, if the generic model has higher posterior
probability than any of the existing empirical model, a new attack model should be intro-
duced.
3.4.2 New Model Introduction
The framework begins with only the generic model defined; in this case the first packets
observed must be classified to the generic model, and will be used to create a new empirical
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Figure 3.5: Generic Model Feature Distributions
model. Since the attack models defined are non-parametric, the processes of actually cre-
ating a model is trivial: the initial packets are simply accumulated in a histogram or kernel
density estimate.
For practicality, some small number of packets must be observed before creating a
model to ensure a reasonable representation of the attack behavior; Figure 3.2 alludes to
the fact that the attack model definitions are not robust with very few samples. All subse-
quent packets will be classified based on the current set of attack models, and the generic
model. If the generic model maximizes the posterior probability for a group of new pack-
ets, another attack model will be created. If one of the empirical models maximizes the
posterior the new packets will be incorporated to update the model.
As a brief example, Figure 3.6 shows an attack social graph at the start of analysis for a
randomly selected target of interest. The set of empirical models is currently empty, so all
packets and edges are associated to the generic model. This attack social graph snapshot
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is taken immediately before the introduction of a new model. Once the new model is
introduced, the packets on the edges, tabulated in Table 3.4.2, are used to initialize the
feature distributions of the first empirical model. Figure 3.7 displays the resulting feature
distribution for the new empirical model created based on the generic packets. As expected,
the attack model feature distributions reflect exclusively TCP traffic with deterministic port
selections from port 6000 to port 2967, used by Symantec AntiVirus software.
Figure 3.6: Model Introduction Example Attack Social Graph
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
3659269076 716112 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710101 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710167 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710160 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710176 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710168 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 710157 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 704247 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 704245 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 704232 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 704240 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 2075358 TCP 6000 2967
Table 3.2: Model Introduction Example Packets
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Figure 3.7: Model Introduction Example New Feature Distributions
In effect, the result of unsupervised learning, creating clusters of behaviors based on
observed data, has been reproduced with an online supervised approach; where the problem
of determining the number of models has been mitigated through the generic model. The
generic model is a logical threshold for determining the model order, and the graphical
prior probability is the other essential novel element for ensuring that the models defined
are based on likely collaborators, not just IP addresses that behaves similarly, regardless of
their position in the attack social graph.
3.5 Segmentation of Irrelevant Behaviors
Modeling attack behaviors is a necessary first step toward segmenting irrelevant traffic that
is probabilistically incident on the attack social graph of interest. Inadvertent attacks on the
same target, and random address spoofing both produce connectivity in the attack graph
that occludes analysis, and definitively discourages any system that infers any two edges
emitted by a source or incident on a target are evidence of collaboration. A thorough mod-
eling, which includes macroscopic graphical features, is essential to inferring collaboration
between actors in the attack graph.
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After defining the modeling portion of the framework, it is also possible to provide more
accurate situational awareness to analysts by segmenting behaviors produced by probabilis-
tic intersection. An analyst may be concerned with traffic several hops away from the target
of interest, but not if it is a dramatic departure in behavior from the activity present at the
target of interest. If traffic behavior changes abruptly as analysis moves more hops away
from the target of interest, it is likely that this path exists only because of probabilistic in-
tersection, or, at least, is not critical to understanding the attack behaviors at the target of
interest.
Determining which components in the attack graph should be segmented is dependent
both on determining which attack behaviors are relevant at the target of interest, and the
path from the target of interest to the node in question. The relevance of an attack model
is determined simply by averaging the posterior probability of the packets incident on the
target of interest; intuitively the relevance of a model is judged purely based on whether
packets assigned to that model are present at the target of interest, as it is the critical point
for analysis. Let E be the set of edges incident on the target of interest, then the relevance,






P (M |e) (3.17)
Packets should be segmented from the attack graph of interest if they do not belong
to any relevant model with high probability. In addition, the path between the nodes to
be segmented is also considered: if a set of packets have high probability under an attack
model, but must pass through several edges with low relevance to be reached, they are
also segmented. In implementation this is similar to the graph-position feature, and the
graphical prior: the concept of Closeness or Efficiency is a common thread joining elements
of the framework. If Ptoi,i is the path between a node i and the target of interest, the
irrelevance of an attack social graph component is given by (3.18). Node i is segmented if











A brief example of the segmentation processing is given by the attack social graph in
Figure 3.8. Table 3.3 also gives the posterior probably for a select set of edges in the attack
social graph; the edges in the graph are not labeled so they can be matched with the edges
in the table, but a general feeling about the expected posterior probability is more critical
than pairing the table and figure. The two edges that are incident on the target of interest
are shown with shaded rows in the table.
In this case, there is only one edge from each attack model incident on the target of
interest, so the relevance is directly determined by these edges: R(Empirical 0) = 0.96,
R(Empirical 1) = 0.00, R(Empirical 2) = 1.00. However, as in (3.17), the relevance of
each attack model is in general determined by the average of the incident edges associated
with that model.
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Edge Number Assigned Model Generic Empirical 0 Empirical 1 Empirical 2
1 Empirical 0 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.00
2 Empirical 0 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.00
3 Empirical 0 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.00
51 Empirical 1 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00
52 Empirical 1 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00
53 Empirical 1 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00
58 Empirical 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
59 Empirical 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
60 Empirical 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 3.3: Segmentation Example Edge Posteriors
The edges associated to Empirical Model 0 are not segmented due to a very small
irrelevance distance; even the edges emitted to other targets require only two hops to reach
the target of interest. The posterior probability of each edge is 0.96, from 3.3, and the
relevance of Empirical Model 0 is high: 0.96. As a result, the irrelevance distance is only




Figure 3.8: Segmentation Example Attack Social Graph
However, the edges that were previously associated with Empirical Model 1, shown in
black, have been segmented, due to total irrelevance of the black model at the target of
interest. As a practical concern, the relevance of a model is not actually allowed to reach
zero, to avoid computational problems with infinite distances. However, conceptually the





0.99∗0.0 = ∞. The
irrelevance of a node is determined by traversing the path from that node to the target of
interest, so the first two terms of the summation result from light gray edges that are the
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first two hops walking toward the black edges. The last term, with the zero denominator,
comes from the black edge itself.
Methodology Recapitulation
In summary, as new packets are incident on the attack social graph, a set of packet-based
features are extracted, and the probability of these features is calculated for the distribu-
tions of each attack model. Based on the attack social graph structure, the prior probability
of each attack model is also calculated, and incorporated to determine the posterior proba-
bility of each attack model. If one of the empirical attack models maximizes the posterior
probability then the new packet is included into the feature distribution estimates; other-
wise, if the generic attack model maximizes the posterior probability, a new attack model
is created to describe this new behavior. After this packet has been classified, it is tested for
relevance at the target of interest. If the packet is classified to an attack model that is not
present at the target of interest, or is not reachable through a probable path it is segmented,




The ASMG processing was completely prototyped in Python, due to its assortment of sci-
entific computing packages and plotting tools. A graphical user interface was implemented
using the TkInter package, which contains two screens: one to provide an online visual-
ization of the current attack social graph and the modeling and segmentation of edges, and
another to visualize the attack model feature distributions.
A screenshot of the attack social graph display is shown in Figure 4.1. The majority
of this display is devoted to the attack social graph, though the bottom table view also
shows the current packet assignment and posterior probabilities for each edge. Directly
above the attack social graph display is a set of tabs to perform side-by-side comparisons
of different processing strategies. For example, the effect of the graphical prior probability
can be observed by including a processing strategy with a uniform prior for comparison,
or the quality of the modeling may be validated by adding a processing strategy that uses a
fixed number of hops to define the attack social graph of interest.
Figure 4.2 is a screenshot of the feature display. In this view, plots of the probability
distributions are shown for the various features and attack models. Each attack model is a
row, and each feature is a column. Some additional modeling information is also included,
like the region in time where the attack has support or the intensity of the attack over time.
The generic attack model distributions are also included for reference.
Section 4.1 opens with a discussion on the usage of the software. Section 4.2 describes
the architecture of the software prototype created, and Section 4.3 describes the flow of the
processing as new packets are observed. Appendix B lists all the modules in the software
and briefly describes the role of each.
4.1 Software Usage
The software prototype has two possible modes of operation: one with the graphical user
interface shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, and another command line mode for collecting
results. The command line mode is also much closer to the goal of a real-time analysis
system. In either case, the main.py module initiates the processing; this module expects
at least one parameter to dictate the mode to run in. Executing python2 main.py run
will start the graphical user interface, and running python2 main.py crawl will
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Figure 4.1: Software Prototype Graph Display
start the command line user interface. The “crawl” terminology is inspired by a web-
crawler: an autonomous processing mode that iterates through different targets of inter-
est. An optional third parameter specifies the obfuscated IP address of the target of inter-
est; i.e. python2 main.py run 2359906 will start the graphical user interface with
2359906 set as the target of interest address.
31
Figure 4.2: Software Prototype Feature Display
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4.1.1 Software Dependencies
The software prototype requires Python 2.7, and uses the following dependencies:
• NumPy – Scientific Computing Library – http://www.numpy.org/
• SciPy – Scientific Computing Library – http://www.scipy.org/
• NetworkX – Network / Graph Library – http://networkx.github.io/
• Matplotlib – Plotting Library similar to plotting in MATLAB – http://matplotlib.org/
• SQLAlchemy – Python SQL Toolkit / ORM – http://www.sqlalchemy.org/
• TkInter – Python Tk GUI Toolkit – http://wiki.python.org/moin/TkInter
4.1.2 Using the Graphical User Interface
A series of screenshots, in Figures 4.3 through 4.9, illustrate the different capabilities and controls
for the graphical user interface defined. To begin, Figure 4.3 again shows the graph display, utilized
for visualizing the attack social graph; this is the default display. When the software is launched,
new traffic will immediately be played back and the display will update. The flow of new traffic can
be stopped and restarted with the “Start”/“Stop” button on the top left; if the flow is stopped, the
“Step” button can be used to play back a single new packet of traffic.
Figure 4.4 highlights the tab control to switch between the graph display and feature display;
this control is located at the very top of the interface. Figure 4.5 showcases the tab control to switch
between different processing strategies. The modular software design, in particular the use of the
Subject-Observer and Strategy design patterns, allows for easy addition and comparison between
different processing strategies. In this case three strategies are compared: a strategy to incrementally
calculate the graphical prior probability, a strategy with a uniform prior probability, and a naı¨ve
strategy that assumes all components in the attack social graph are attributed to the same attack
behavior.
Clicking between the tabs will switch the appearance of the attack social graph, and will affect
the likelihood values in the edge likelihood display. For example, selecting the “Naı¨ve Model” tab
updates the attack social graph, as in Figure 4.6. All edges are now shown attributed to the same
empirical model, which reflects the naı¨ve assumption that all included traffic is generated by the
same attack behavior.
Figure 4.7 highlights the tab control to switch between the packet display and edge likelihood
display at the bottom of the graph display. The packet display shows all the features of the received
packets and additional information: the received time and database ID.
Conversely, Figure 4.8 shows the graph display with the edge likelihood tab selected. Each row
in the tree control displays the assigned model and the posterior probability values for an edge in
the attack social graph. An identification number is also included, as well as how many packets
have been observed on this edge. If the “Display Labels” check box is selected, directly above this
display, the edge identification numbers will be shown on the graph for convenience.
Expanding any of the tree control elements will show the posterior probabilities for each model
given the evidence that has been observed on that edge. For the edge expanded in Figure 4.8 Empir-
ical Model 0 is by far the most probable, but there generic model still has some marginal probability,
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Figure 4.3: Software Prototype Graph Display
as expected, since it fits all behaviors modestly well.
Finally, Figure 4.9 highlights that the same set of tab controls used to control the current pro-
cessing strategy is included on the feature display; the feature distributions will update based on the
current tab selection. However, due to the computation load associated with drawing the plots, in
particular the port plots with many possible values, the feature distributions do not update live as
new samples are added to the models. Instead, a “Refresh Models” button is included at the bottom
of the feature display to force an update of the feature distribution plots.
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Figure 4.4: Tab Control to Switch Display
Figure 4.5: Tab Control to Switch Processing Strategy
4.1.3 Using the Command Line User Interface
The command line user interface provides many less features, and is intended for collecting results
autonomously and without the overhead of the graphical user interface. Running in command line
mode will simply issue a prompt; the “run” command will start the playback of traffic for the target
of interest specified in the command line arguments. The attack social graph and samples used
to create the models will be periodically logged as the command line version runs. The “stop”
command will pause the processing, or the “exit” command will terminate execution entirely. The
“models” command can be used to force a dump of the attack model sample data, and the “stats”
command can be used to force a dump of profiling and execution statistics.
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Figure 4.6: Attack Social Graph with Naı¨ve Model Selected
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Figure 4.7: Tab Control to Switch Packet or Edge Display
Figure 4.8: Edge Display with Tree Control Expanded
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Figure 4.9: Feature Display Tab Controls
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4.2 Software Design Patterns
The system is architected on two principle design patterns: the “Observer” pattern and the “Strat-
egy” pattern. Either the graphical or command line interfaces are implemented as different “ob-
servers”, which reflect the changes in the “subject”. An abstract class is defined both for the
Observer and Subject, and define the public contracts for the pattern elements. Either of the
user interfaces inherit from the Observer class and implement that contract. Any of the process-
ing strategies inherit the Subject class, and fulfill the contract of responding to “updates” from
the observers. Similarly, classes which inherit from Observer fulfill the contract for respond-
ing to “notifications” from the subject. The “update” and “notification” terminology is consistent
throughout the software implementation and quickly indicates the flow of communication between
user interface components.
The next complication is that the user interface and processing are divided into several sub-
components. For example, several different source files and classes define the user interface:
gui_edge_frame.py, gui_feature_frame.py, gui_graph_frame.py,
gui_packet_frame.py, gui_parameters.py, gui.py. The processing is similarly di-
vided into subcomponents; for both the subject and observers the tasks are divided among different
modules. To accommodate this modular structure consistently the “chain of responsibility” pattern
is adopted. As with the “Observer” pattern components, a ResponsibilityChain superclass
defines a public contract for any class in the responsibility chain. Conceptually, this pattern treats a
scenario where processing is distributed between different components, each of which can service
part of a requested task. A request or task is passed to the head of the chain, which will service the
request if it knows how, and then will pass the request on to all of its successors. The next node,
similarly, will service the request if it can, and then will pass it along. The getattr function can
be used to easily check if a class implements a method, so elements of the responsibility chain can
easily determine if they can handle a request.
As a brief example, if a new edge is added to the attack social graph, the main graph display
must be updated, as well as the tree control of edges in the bottom edge likelihood display. The
gui.py module is the top-level user interface component in the graphical case, and this is where
the responsibility chain begins. The processing strategy, the subject, sends a new_edge notification
to the main TkGUI class. The TkGUI class does not have a handler to service this request, so it is
passed along to all other members of the responsibility chain. Both the GuiEdgeFrame and the
GuiGraphFrame are in the chain, and have methods to handle this notification. Both of the frame
components will service the request, so the social graph and tree control are updated.
The final influence on the overall software design is the “Strategy” pattern; many of the com-
ponents in the module listing, in Appendix B, incorporate the strategy nomenclature to allude to
this pattern. The “Strategy” pattern wraps an algorithm in a class, with an abstract superclass to
define a public contract representing the strategies purpose; the superclass defines the problem to
solve. Difference concrete “Strategies” or subclasses provide different implementations to solve
this problem, which can be exchanged at runtime. This pattern is utilized for the Attack Segmen-
tation and Model Generation processing so that the effect of different system components can be
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compared side-by-side. For example, different strategies are defined for the prior probability; the
graphical strategy can be compared with a uniform prior simply be instantiating another strategy.
Or, as another example, the generic model introduction strategy can be compared with a simple
scalar threshold-based approach.
As with the other processing strategies incorporated, the nomenclature of the Strategy pattern is
followed strictly throughout the software implementation so the overall architecture remains clear.
The Strategy pattern also enables easy comparison of different experimental additions or regression
testing of optimized implementations.
4.3 Processing Flow
In the intended final application, the Attack Segmentation and Model Generation processing would
be incorporated into a real network, instantaneously monitoring the incident traffic. As a conse-
quence the processing is event based, responding to incoming traffic. The CAIDA data captures
available, however, are stored simply as a MySQL table. The attack_player.py module acts
as a “middle-man” between the data source and the event-based processing: the module reads pack-
ets from the data source, and presents them to the ASGM processing as asynchronous events. The
intent is to simulate the realistic event driven scenario where new traffic is incident on the network.
Subclasses of the attack player exist to read from a MySQL table, log file, or Wireshark traffic
dump.
High-Level Sequence Diagram
An AttackPlayer object will generate asynchronous events for the main segmentation and
model generation processing; a high-level sequence diagram of the processing response is shown
in Figure 4.10. The asynchronous update, update_add_packet, triggers the processing. The
first step performed is the classification, which is left as a black-box in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.11
expands the classification procedure with another sequence diagram. Once a new sample is classi-
fied, it is also added to the attack models based on the posterior probability; the higher the posterior
probability the more the sample influences the model’s feature distributions. In addition, the edge
posterior probability is updated to reflect the new sample. Previously the edge posterior was defined
as the product of the packet probabilities, as if each packet was a new independent observation,
however computationally this is implemented by accumulating log probabilities. Accumulating log
probabilities is regarded as more numerically stable.
Once the edge posterior probability is updated, the model introduction processing is updated to
reflect this change. If there are enough packets in the attack social graph allocated to the generic
model and the generic model is centralized enough, a new attack model is created. The model intro-
duction processing is updated iteratively with each edge update, to prevent redundant, and expen-
sive, graph distance calculations. The return from the model introduction processing is a boolean,
which indicates whether or not a new attack model should be introduced; this is indicated with an
“alt” block in Figure 4.10. Introducing a new attack model is computationally expensive, in that
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aside from just creating the new model, the normally iterative prior probability and segmentation
processing must be entirely reinitialized. The complete process of adding a new attack model is
encapsulated within a method of the ProcessingStrategy.
Finally, the segmentation processing is also iteratively updated. The iterative update to the
segmentation calculation must both query the attack models, in case the relevance has updated, and
also the posterior probability of the edge for the received packet. If the graph distance to the current
edge is greater than a threshold it will immediately be segmented.
One final consideration is that the sequence digram shown is for the ASMG processing, which
is only one ProcessingStrategy subclass. In addition a NaiveProcessingStrategy
subclass is included which is used for evaluation in the discussion of results; this implementation
does not divide traffic into models and assumes that all traffic within N hops of the target of interest
is relevant. As the name indicates, this strategy is very naı¨ve and inadequate. Possible future sub-
classes may include a strategy that does not perform iterative decisions, but waits until all traffic has
been received; similar to host-clustering. Possibly another alternative to evaluate would be a system
that segments the same traffic as the ASMG processing, but does not perform modeling. All of these
possible strategy combinations could evaluate the contribution of different system components for
different targets of interest.
41
Figure 4.10: Top-Level Sequence Diagram
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Classifier Sequence Diagram
The classifier sequence diagram in Figure 4.11 outlines the programmatic steps for finding the max-
imum a posteriori attack model. The software implementation for this portion is a simple extension
from the mathematical formula. The outer-most loop iterates over the set of attack models, and
calculates the prior probability and likelihood for each model. The prior is calculated first; however,
similar to the model introduction processing and segmentation processing this requires many graph
distance calculations and is only iteratively updated with each new packet. Unfortunately the graph-
ical prior calculation is particularly difficult to implement iteratively, and there are many edge cases
to treat. For example, adding a new edge to the graph may introduce a new shortest path between
nodes, or the reassignment of an edge to another attack model may destroy the shortest path be-
tween nodes in the old attack model. Despite the complexity in implementation, the computational
savings for only iteratively updating the priors are significant.
The second component of the outer-most loop is the likelihood calculation; there is a seperate
LikelihoodStrategy class defined for this calculation. Some initial experimentation was done
with non-independent treatment of the features, and by wrapping this algorithm as a class it was sim-
ple to perform runtime comparisons between different implementations. The LikelihoodStrategy
itself has a loop over the attack model features while calculating the likelihood; the module accu-
mulates the log probabilities of each feature over this loop. Finally, since the distribution estimate
is non-parametric, estimating the probability of a new sample involves an interior loop over each of
the samples allocated to the attack model. For a histogram this inner loop just counts the number
of samples in the attack model distribution that match the feature value of the new packet. For a
continuous feature the inner loop accumulates the density contributed by the kernel function at each
point.
Once the posterior probability is calculated for each attack model the classifier simply selects
the attack model with the maximal value. The posterior probability of input sample are mutated
to reflect the posterior distribution, and in the future this packet will contribute to the attack model
distributions based on the posterior value.
4.4 Handling of Highly-Active Elements
One programmatic concern that is not present in the conceptual design of the Attack Segmentation
and Model Generation processing is the treatment of highly active elements. The “Highly-Active”
terminology encompasses attack behaviors that generate edges at a very high rate: i.e. the sources
that are very active in the attack social graph. Example highly active cases could be spoofed-source
denial of service attacks, or fast random scans. It is critical that the ASMG processing itself does
not become inundated with traffic and fail to function. For example, with a denial of service attack,
the analysis processing itself can not become overloaded and “deny service”.
Instead, a simple module, HighlyActiveDetector, is included to detect and simplify the
processing for highly-active elements. For each source and target in the graph, the out-degree or
in-degree of nodes with degree one is stored. If the number of adjacent nodes with degree one is
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Figure 4.11: Classifier Sequence Diagram
greater than a threshold value, the source or target is labeled as highly active. The highly active
behaviors described, either a spoofed-address high rate attack, high rate backscatter, or a fast scan
will all appear in the attack social graph as a central node with very large degree and many adjacent
nodes with degree one. For example, a fast scan will have a single central source node and many
targets with only that single attack behavior incident, at least within some time window. If a source
or target node is identified as highly active, no further queries for that type of traffic are made into
the traffic database by the AttackPlayer, since the following traffic is presumably redundant.
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In addition, to effecting the AttackPlayer, if an node is marked as highly-active all loca-
tions where graph distance processing is applied, the values for highly-active node neighbors with
equivalent distances are cached to expedite processing. For example, if the source in the center of
the dark-gray clustering the top-right was marked as a highly-active element, the graph distances to
the dark-gray target nodes could be cached. From the perspective of the black or light-gray nodes,
the distance through the graph is equivalent to all the neighbors of the highly-active source node.
For traffic captures with denial-of-service, scanning or backscatter, the highly-active processing is
an essential computational improvement.




5.1 Design of Experiments
Malicious traffic captures provided by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)
were used to exhibit the performance of the ASMG processing. This traffic was captured on the
CAIDA UCSD network telescope over two days in November 2008 [17]. Network Telescope traffic
[12, 15, 22] is an excellent opportunity for observing and segmenting probabilistically connected at-
tack behaviors, as it is primarily composed of Malware scanning or spoofed-address backscatter. A
network telescope, or darknet, is a range of IP addresses that are left unused, or “dark”, but incom-
ing traffic is still monitored. Moore et al. [12] and Shannon et al. [15] explain that since there are no
live hosts within the network telescope all incident traffic is either the result of misconfigurations or
malicious behaviors.
Mirkovia and Reiher [11] provide a taxonomy of different scanning behaviors for programmatic
Malwares or Worms. Many simple implementations will randomly select new addresses to scan,
with the principle problem being wasteful overlap in the scanning between different compromised
nodes. However, even more sophisticated strategies like Signpost scanning where the infected nodes
communicate information about their scanning regions or Permutation scanning where addresses to
scan are chosen with pseudo-random permutations, the result is still a very stochastic search across
the IP address space. Any probes to the unused “dark” address with be captured for analysis by the
network telescope.
Backscatter is an inadvertent side effect of spoofed-address traffic, particularly denial of service
attacks. If an attack spoofs its source IP addresses, and behaves such that the target address will
generate reply traffic, the target will produce “backscatter”: packets sent back to the fabricated
source address. If the spoofed source address resides in the range of addresses monitored by the
network telescope, the backscatter will be observed as incoming traffic.
The exact characterization of network telescope traffic is not critical, but the observations that
neither the scanning or backscatter behaviors are inherently coordinated is important to dispelling
the assumption that any interaction between hosts should be characterized as the same attack be-
havior.
A final characteristic of the CAIDA network telescope data used is that only the packet header
information is available, which is in part responsible for the limited feature set used. In some cases
payload analysis could also be used to infer similar attack behaviors, though this analysis would
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presumably be more details and possibly manual or offline.
For the experiments performed different target of interest IP addresses were randomly selected
from the set of all target addresses present in the traffic capture, and the traffic experienced by that
target and the surrounding addresses was replayed to emulate an online flow of new traffic. Targets
of interest were selected randomly, not preferentially, to provide a survey of performance across
different attack scenarios.
Subsection 5.2 opens with a simple example attack social graph to illustrate how the attack so-
cial graphs are visualized after applying the ASMG processing, and also to verify that an online,
supervised approach can produce the same effect as an offline unsupervised method. Experiments
then follow to showcase the importance of the graphical prior probability and to highlight the dis-
crepancy in objective between the ASMG processing and host clustering: the goal is not just to find
similar clusters of behaviors, but to determine collaborating groups.
The experiments and results are divided into sections, to exhibit the following achievements:
• An online supervised approach can solve a traditionally unsupervised clustering problem
• Parallel coordinate plots provide a visualization for the high-dimensional feature space used,
and can qualitatively verify the modeling results
• The graphical prior probability is essential to determining potential collaborators; instead of
just clustering similar behaviors
• The ASMG processing can be quantitatively evaluated, and both the segmentation and mod-
eling portions of the framework significantly outperform naı¨ve methods over a large set of
randomly selected targets of interest
5.2 Verification of Clustering
Figure 5.1 shows a simple example attack social graph after replaying the attack traffic and applying
the ASMG processing. The target of interest is shown in black, near the center of the attack social
graph. The association of edges in the attack social graph to attack models is indicated with shades
of grayscale: in this case four different attack models directly interact with the target of interest.
The nodes associated to each of the attack models are also outlined in the shade corresponding
to that model for clarity. The segmented packets are visually indicated with dotted lines; many
different shades and models are present on the fringe of the attack graph which have been segmented.
Examining the packets themselves, the four large clusters of edges that intersect at the target of
interest are likely different Malware behaviors which target common ports: empirical model 13 is
HTTP traffic, empirical model 8 is UDP traffic on the MySQL monitor port, etc. A small set of
packets for the four attack models are shown tabulated in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4.
A first observation from this attack social graph is that the online supervised approach used
has accomplished, in effect, the same task as unsupervised learning techniques. Similar behaviors
have been broken into four distinct clusters. This attack social graph also exemplifies probabilistic
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Table 5.1: Empirical Model 0 Example Traffic
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
2098966479 11097649 UDP 12470 137
2098966479 7125860 UDP 11802 137
2098966479 7125896 UDP 11802 137
2098966479 9352394 UDP 11801 137
2098966479 13398557 UDP 11801 137
2098966479 14137791 UDP 10015 137
Table 5.2: Empirical Model 5 Example Traffic
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
3659269076 11097649 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 8672123 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 8672076 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 8672126 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 8678082 TCP 6000 2967
3659269076 8678014 TCP 6000 2967
Table 5.3: Empirical Model 8 Example Traffic
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
3723096580 11097649 UDP 1138 1434
3723096580 14970269 UDP 1138 1434
3723096580 9547951 UDP 1138 1434
3723096580 14626721 UDP 1138 1434
3723096580 11565648 UDP 1138 1434
3723096580 7696344 UDP 10015 1434
Table 5.4: Empirical Model 13 Example Traffic
Source Address Destination Address Protocol Source Port Destination Port
2030727992 11097649 TCP 80 5958
2030727992 14970269 TCP 80 1904
2030727992 9547951 TCP 80 15163
2030727992 14626721 TCP 80 8813
2030727992 11565648 TCP 80 25385
2030727992 7696344 TCP 80 3137
intersection; the four behaviors that all send packets to the target of interest are almost certainly
not coordinated. Given the large number of different target addresses scanned by the source at the
center of each of the four large clusters, this intersection is almost certainly by chance. Additionally,
there is not attempt by any of the behaviors to actually exploit the targeted service at the target of
interest, there is only a single packet sent as a probe. In this simple case the attack social graph is
easy to draw inferences from because the four behaviors are both isolated in the graph and in the
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Figure 5.1: A Simple Example Attack Social Graph
feature space.
The target nodes on the bottom fringe of the graph which have one incident edge from the dense
lightest colored cluster, and other edge from segmented behaviors, are also evidence of probabilistic
overlap. The segmented behaviors are a significant departure from the included traffic, and again
there is very little evidence to suggest that there is true coordinated behavior present at these targets.
5.3 Feature Space Visualization
For more complex cases it is difficult to qualitatively verify the quality of the modeling result with-
out visualizing the packets in the feature space; inferring behavior from tables of packets, like in the
first case, is less effective in more complex cases. The principal difficulty in this visualization is the
dimensionality of the feature space: for example Figure 3.3 and Subsection 3.2 allude to a six di-
mensional feature space. Clearly for this dimensionality a simple scatter plot is not feasible. Instead
parallel coordinate plots are used to depict the high-dimensional feature spaces. Each column in a
parallel coordinate plot represents a different feature or dimension in the high-dimensional space,
and each line through the plot represents an input point. A column is included for the protocol,
graph position, ICMP type if relevant, and source and destination port values if relevant. In this
case it is not critical to explicitly display the port entropy feature values since it is visually intuitive
whether the selection is deterministic or stochastic; the following example will exhibit this intution.
To exhibit the parallel coordinate visualization Figure 5.2 shows the attack social graph for
another target of interest, which is a slightly more complex case. In this case empirical models 0
and 8 includes several more hops away from the target of interest, and empirical model 8 includes
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a set of suspicious repeat collaborators. These repeat collaborators participate in the attacks against
two targets, which is an indicator that there may be authentic collaboration, and that these sources
may authentically be part of the same attack behavior.
Figure 5.2: A More Complex Attack Social Graph
Figure 5.3 shows a parallel coordinate plot for the same social graph, without the ASMG pro-
cessing applied. Instead, the attack social graph represented in this parallel coordinate plot is pro-
duced by a very naı¨ve approach. All traffic within four hops of the target of interest is considered
to be relevant, and all of the traffic is considered as the same attack model: all the edges incident
on the target of interest are assumed to be authentic collaboration. Clearly the parallel coordinate
representation is very disorderly, and it is not possible to make statements about the attack traffic
overall.
Instead, Figure 5.4 shows a parallel coordinate plot for each of the models determined by the
ASMG processing. The behaviors present are not entirely deterministic, but the plots are signifi-
cantly more clear and it is possible to make inferences about the attack behavior. For example, even
though empirical models 0 and 1 appear to choose destination port stochastically, the behavior is
still clear: perhaps these behaviors are vertical scans across destination port or are the results of
backscatter. The parallel coordinate plots are improved due to both the modeling and segmenta-
tion: dividing the set of all traffic into different models certainly clarifies analysis, and omitting the
irrelevant behaviors that have been segmented also yields significant improvement.
The effect of the graphical prior probability is also subtly evident in this result; in Figure 5.4 it is
evident that empirical model 8 contains a mix of different destination port behaviors. The attack as a
whole appears to select source port stochastically, but there are also clearly three distinct destination
port behaviors. The likelihood of the received packets could be improved by introducing one or two
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Figure 5.3: Parallel Coordinate Plot without ASMG Processing
Figure 5.4: Parallel Coordinate Plot with ASMG Processing
additional attack models to cover each destination port selection. This is restatement of the model
order problem in unsupervised learning: some weighting must be applied to favor parsimonious
solutions, otherwise the likelihood can be minimized by introducing an attack behavior for every
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point. In addition, it is also important to recall that the attack social graph in Figure 5.2 shows that
empirical model 8 includes a set of repeat collaborators, which is evidence for authentic coordinated
behavior. This graph structure is very “efficient”, as defined by Latora and Marchiori [8], and as a
result the prior probability is also high, so differences in the feature space are weighed less heavily.
This case exemplifies the difference between the objective of identifying collaborators from the
same attach behavior and providing situational awareness versus the objective of only clustering
similar behaviors.
5.4 Effect of the Graphical Prior
Figure 5.5 presents a more direct example about the effect of the graphical prior probability. The
attack social graph shown in Figure 5.5 shows the result of the ASMG processing. There is strong
evidence of authentic collaboration in this attack social graph again in this case: there are many
instances of repeat collaborations against the targets in the center of empirical model 4. A set of
common targets this large is not likely to occur probabilistically, especially as a proportion of the
total traffic generated by the sources. Figure 5.6 shows a parallel coordinate plot for the feature
spaces of the different attack models in the attack social graph. Again, there is some discrepancy
in the feature space for the empirical model with the repeat collaborators present. In this case the
discrepancy is particularly trivial: the same service is targeted by all of the packets assigned to this
model, but there are two distinct source ports utilized by the different packets. Because of the repeat
collaboration, and the inclusion of the graphical prior, the ASMG processing again produces only
a single attack model. Intuitively, this is an appropriate decision for this case: there is significant
evidence of collaboration between the sources in the attack model, and the differences in the feature
space are small. Introducing another attack model to explain the discrepancy in source port behavior
would improve the likelihood of the packet features, but would produce a more complex description
of the received traffic.
Conceptually, the trade off between maximizing the likelihood of the clustered observations,
and minimizing the complexity of the model is the same problem faced by unsupervised learning.
Claiming every packet in the attack social graph belongs to a single attack optimizes the intuitive
constraint about minimizing model complexity, while claiming that every packet belongs to its own
attack model would maximize the packet likelihood. The graphical prior probability implicitly helps
find the balancing point between the two extremes.
For comparison, Figure 5.7 shows the same attack social graph but with the graphical prior
probability omitted; instead, a uniform prior is used that assumes all attack models are equiprobable.
The result is not surprising: without incorporating the macroscopic graph structure, the processing
can not weigh the evidence of repeat collaboration and two attack models are created based on the
small difference in source port behavior. Despite the improvement in the feature likelihood with the
additional model included, this is, again, not the objective of an online system providing situational
awareness; the goal is to infer likely collaborators, not simply to cluster similar behaviors.
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Figure 5.5: Attack Social Graph with ASMG Processing Applied
Figure 5.6: Parallel Coordinate Plot with ASMG Processing
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Figure 5.7: Attack Social Graph without Graphical Prior
5.4.1 Effect of the Packet-Level Features
The emphasis on the effect of the graphical prior probability and the objective of inferring com-
ponents of the same attack model is not to downplay the impact of the packet-level features. To
complement the previous examples, Figure 5.8 shows an attack social graph with very unclear graph
structure, but clear differences packet-level features. In particular, the association of edges to the
black and light gray models toward the bottom of the social graph is unclear; the assignment appears
very disorderly. The graph structure is dense, but not confined to separate regions, as in the previous
attack models.
However, the assignment of packets to attack models in the feature space is completely intuitive
in this case; there are clearly two disjoint behaviors. A parallel coordinate plot for the first two
attack models that have not been segmented is shown in Figure 5.9. The light gray model is ICMP
traffic all with icmp-type 8, i.e. echo requests. Whereas the black model is TCP traffic targeting
the Network Core Protocol, with random source port selection. This example illustrates the balance
of the approach, that despite the emphasis on the novel inclusion of a graphical prior probability,
the packet-level information remains very useful. In fact, in this particular case the packet-level
information isolates two different attack behaviors where the graphical information clearly could
not.
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Figure 5.8: Attack Social Graph with Complex Graph Structure
Figure 5.9: Parallel Coordinate Plot to Contrast Complex Graph Structure
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5.5 Quantitative Results
5.5.1 Design of Experiment
In addition to a case-by-case analysis of different targets of interest, a qualitative result over a larger
set of targets of interest is shown in Figure 5.10. Conceptually, this plot compares and contrasts
three different approaches: the ASMG processing, one alternative approach to validate the model
generation performance, and one alternative to validate the quality of the segmentation. The quantity
measured on the y-axis is the expected value of the packet likelihood, as calculated by (5.1). This
is the expected value of the “likelihood”, or feature-based term, of the Bayesian calculation used to
perform the modeling and segmentation. Again, the naı¨ve assumption of independence is applied
here, so this is the expectation over the set of all packets, of the product of the probability of each
feature, i, in the feature set, Fall.





More colloquially, this measures on average how well the packets fit to the assigned model.
This is the same objective function used in the Expectation Maximization algorithm, for example,
or the equivalent of minimizing intra-cluster distance in other clustering algorithms. The similarity
to traditional objective functions prompted this choice of objective function. Figure 5.10 then is
an evaluation under the pure unsupervised learning criteria. Different, randomly selected, targets
of interest are shown along the x-axis, sorted by the expected packet likelihood using the ASMG
processing.
The plot shows three curves. The solid black curve displays the expected likelihood of the pack-
ets deemed relevant by the ASMG processing, and the expected packet likelihood is evaluated by
taking the expected value of the likelihood of the packets once assigned to the attack model the
ASMG processing has determined. Alternatively, the thick dashed curve depicts the expected like-
lihood under the naı¨ve, four-hop, model described earlier. This model assumes that all intersection
at sources or targets is authentic and that all attack behaviors present should be analyzed together.
Four hops was chosen as a compromise over the range of number of hops common in the ASMG
processing; for example, in Figure 5.1 the ASMG processing considers a maximum of three hops
from the target of interest, whereas in Figure 5.2 a maximum of five hops, and in some other cases
many more, are considered. Four was chosen as an compromise.
Finally, the thin dotted line shows the expected packet likelihood for the packets that have been
segmented from the attack social graph by the ASMG processing. As the ASMG processing runs,
these packets have been associated to attack models which were deemed irrelevant and then were
excluded from analysis. However, for this evaluation these packets were re-associated with one
of the relevant attack models; whichever maximized the posterior probability. The re-association
demonstrates that the segmented packets fit the relevant models with very low probability and were
appropriate to segment; the thin dotted curve is consistently very far below the solid black line
drawn for the included packets. The comparison between the solid black and thick dashed lines
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Figure 5.10: Performance of ASMG Processing Over Many Targets of Interest
demonstrates the quality of the modeling: by dividing the packets into different attack models, and
allowing for the fact that much of the intersection that occurs is probabilistic, the likelihood of the
packets improves significantly. The comparison between the solid black curve and the thin dotted
curve demonstrates the quality of the segmentation: the packets that were excluded have very low
probability relative to the packets that were retained and belong to attack models present at the target
of interest.
5.5.2 Evaluation
As a general trend the ASMG processing performs very well: it always produces a higher packet
likelihood than a naı¨ve approach. The segmentation results are equally encouraging: the segmented
packets always have lower probability than the included packets, often by orders of magnitude.
There are, however, some cases where the naı¨ve approach offers similar performance, especially if
the attack social graph has inherently simple structure, this model is not an egregious choice.
For example, Figure 5.11 shows an example where the expected packet likelihood value under
the naı¨ve model is 0.9885, which is both very high and very close to the ASMG value of 0.9990.
In this case the attack social graph is very simple, and is a fairly isolated island from the rest of the
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traffic capture. The only edge that probabilistically attaches to this attach behavior is the light gray
edge in the bottom right: this edge is the only difference between the segmentation processing and
naı¨ve model. The model generation processing also produces no benefit in this case, since all of
the relevant edges belong to a single attack model. However, certainly the performance of the naı¨ve
approach is not consistent over the set of different attack social graphs, and is very poor in some
cases. The cases where the naı¨ve strategy performs well are similar cases with very simple graph
structures.
Figure 5.11: Example Case where Naı¨ve Model Performs Well
Evaluation of Acceptable Cases
Without regard for model complexity, an ideal result would produce an expected packet likelihood
of one, and in fact the ASMG processing nearly achieves this in the majority of cases. However,
there are also many less than ideal cases within the first third of the target of interest set. There are
two independent explanations for the sub-ideal performance in these cases. Many of the cases with
probability between 0.75 and 0.95 are examples like the attack social graph shown in Figure 5.5:
the expected packet likelihood is deliberately compromised because of the graphical prior.
In addition to Figure 5.5, Figure 5.12 gives a strong example of a case where compromise
occurs. There are many occurrences of suspicious repeat collaboration in the lightest gray model;
however, as before the behaviors linked by the collaborators are only similar, but not identical. As
a result, the expected packet probability drops to 0.7632.
The graph-position feature also degrades the prior probability in this case: subgraph of nodes
assigned to the lightest gray model, predominantly on the left-hand side of the attack social graph,
is large and there are many different “types of nodes” in the graph. Unlike the simple example in
Figure 5.1, where the nodes of each attack model are all very similar and located in a uniform ring,
the nodes in the lightest gray subgraph have many different positions in the graph. As a result,
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the graph-position probability density becomes much flatter: there are many values observed when
creating the density estimate, and as a result each value becomes less probable, and the likelihood
dips as a result. However, despite the relatively low expected likelihood, the assignment of nodes
to attack models is not unreasonable; there is evidence of collaboration in the graph structure in the
light gray model.
Figure 5.12: Attack Social Graph with Compromised Likelihood
Evaluation of Unacceptable Cases
The cases with the lowest expected likelihood present an opportunity for future improvement; in
these cases multiple new behaviors are incident on the attack social graph at the same time, while
one of the attack models is first being created. In these cases the resulting empirical models capture
a superposition of two or more behaviors. Once the non-parametric distribution estimates have
learned this superposition as the behavior of an attack model, there is no processing to realize that
two or more separate regimes are present within the model, and to split the attack model in parts.
At its core, the ASMG processing a greedy, online method, and future work could improve these
select cases by including the ability to divide or merge the models created. A complete discussion
of adjusting the processing to improve these cases is included in Subsection 6.1.1.
Figure 5.13 is an example of a sub-optimal case, with expected packet likelihood of only 0.4679;
in this case nearly all of the nodes in the social graph are assigned to the black model which is
a large conglomerate of different attack behaviors. There are a few small groups of segmented
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components, but all of the relevant packets are associated to black model. The feature distributions
for empirical model 0, in black, are shown in Figure 5.14. The only discriminating factor is the
protocol distribution: all packets in the conglomerate model are TCP, however the distributions of
source and destination port are both initialized with a combination of behaviors and learn stochastic
behaviors. Similarly, the graph position density has some shape, but is nearly uniform over for all
graph position values between 0.0 and 0.7; the distribution is not perfectly uniform but it is very
general, and many values have high density. Since the source port, destination port, and graph
position features are not discriminating, any TCP traffic fits this model with high probability: it has
become a “generic” model for TCP traffic.
Figure 5.13: Attack Social Graph with Conglomerate Attack Model
The qualitative results presented illustrate that an online supervised approach can solve a tradi-
tionally unsupervised problem, and produce intuitive models. These cases also validate the impor-
tance of the graphical prior probability, particularly when contrasted with a uniform prior probabil-
ity. Finally, the quantitative evaluation over a large set of targets of interest verifies the accuracy
of both the segmentation and model generation components of the ASMG processing by compar-
ing with a naı¨ve four-hop model and by comparing the likelihood of the included packets with the
segmented packets.
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Together, the re-characterization of a seemingly unsupervised problem as an online supervised prob-
lem, the novel introduction of a graphical prior probability, and the inclusion of the generic attack
model as a threshold for introducing new attack models accomplish the objective of simultaneously
segmenting and modeling large-scale cyber attack traffic. The principle novel contributions of the
Attack Segmentation and Model Generation are:
An Online Alternative to Unsupervised Learning The approach of classifying packets to the max-
imum a posteriori attack model, empirically updating the attack models with non-parametric
distributions tremendously improves efficiency, compared with unsupervised learning, for
processing new packets. The generic model is an additional novel element to control the
introduction of new attack models and to balance between the conflicting objectives of maxi-
mizing the likelihood of the packet and preferring a parsimonious solution.
Graphical Prior Probability The inclusion of the graphical prior probability in the Bayesian clas-
sification processing enables the ASMG processing to incorporate macroscopic graphical in-
formation. With this graphical information the processing can infer which packets are pro-
duced by the same attack behavior, instead of simply clustering packets with similar packet-
level features.
Consideration of Probabilistic Intersection and Segmenting Irrelevant Traffic Finally, the seg-
mentation processing is essential for reducing the scope of received traffic when probabilistic
intersection is present in the received data. This consideration in particular is not addresses
by previous host clustering works. This portion of the processing is useful, even aside from
the modeling, in reducing the amount of data provided to an analyst.
Test data, in this case network telescope traffic, was provided by the Cooperative Association
for Internet Data Analysis, and both the segmentation and modeling processing were demonstrated
to provide considerable improvement over strategies which segmented packets naı¨vely, or did not
model different attack behaviors. The ASMG processing always outperformed naı¨ve methods, and
in many cases provided near-optimal representations of the received attack behaviors. However, the
discussion of results did present some sub-optimal cases and Section 6.1 discusses future work to
enhance the processing in general, or to improve some of the sub-optimal cases specifically.
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6.1 Future Work
Opportunities for future work are divided into two subsection, based on the severity and intent of
the opportunity. Subsection 6.1.1 suggests strategies to address two of the critical issues addressed
in the result and software design chapters. Subsection 6.1.2 presents some potential enhancements
to improve the functionality of the ASMG processing.
6.1.1 Significant Improvements
Non-Greedy Refining of Models
As discussed at the end of the Results chapter with Figure 5.13 if multiple attack behaviors are
present when the empirical models are first being learned, the model produced will be a mixture of
both behaviors. In this worst cases, this model will continue to combine other behaviors and learn
very general distributions, similar to the generic model. The performance of the system could be
significantly improved by remedying this behavior with one of two possible solutions.
One option is to recognize that two distinct attack behaviors are present when the empirical
model is created. Immediately before introducing the new attack model there are a set of edges and
packets currently associated with the generic model, and after enough packets have been observed
a new empirical model will be created from this evidence. A possible solution is to add processing
to diagnose that two or more different attack behaviors are present in the packets assigned to the
generic model, and to divide these into different empirical models. This is a preventative approach.
Alternatively, a palliative approach would be to periodically refine the attack models so the
processing is not entirely greedy. Once the online greedy processing has grouped multiple attack
behaviors into a single model, the palliative processing would revise the modeling and break the
combined model into others. The preventative approach is more appropriate for the model introduc-
tion processing, but the palliative approach is more general and may also help in other hypothetical
cases. For example, if the attack behavior were to change slowly over time the palliative approach
could separate past and present behaviors into different models, whereas the preventative approach
would produce degraded performance, as in the “boiling frog” anecdote. With the preventative ap-
proach, If the attack model doesn’t contain distinct different behaviors at its creation it will never be
refined, and can slowly be degraded into a superposition of many different attack behaviors as long
as the change does not occur rapidly.
Real-Time Performance
As noted in the Software Prototyping chapter, currently the performance of the system is not real-
time: it is an online design, but not real-time. Python is not an ideal choice for real-time perfor-
mance, and an implementation in a lower-level language may offer significant improvement.
The software has been profiled, and the majority of the computation time is spent in the graph
distance calculations used by the graphical prior probability, graph-position feature, and segmen-
tation processing. The graph shortest path calculations were performed by the NetworkX library,
63
which were not tailored to this processing. Significant processing time could be saved by buffering
the graph distance, and calculating the graph distance to new nodes incident on the attack social
graph by appending the distance of the new edge to the distance of the neighboring nodes. As a
trivial example, if a graph currently contains three nodes “A”, “B”, and “C”, arranged in a line: i.e.
“A” has an edge to “B”, “B” has an incoming edge from “A” and an outgoing edge to “C”. If a
new node, “D”, joins the network with an incoming edge from “C”, the distance from “A” to “D”
will be calculated by entirely reinitializing and calculating the shortest path calculation. Whereas, a
significant improvement would be to just append the distance from “C” to “D” to the distance from
“A” to “C”. Given the proportion of processing time spent calculating graph distances, any efforts
to algorithmically improve the efficiency of this calculation would be valuable.
Finally, the Bayesian classification process is inherently parallel. The likelihood and prior term
for each model must be calculated and multiplied, and there are no dependencies here between the
attack models. Potentially a separate thread could calculate the posterior term for each attack model
and a master thread could collect the values and take the maximum. The principle concern with
parallelizing this step would be with regard to the size of the parallel task: the likelihood calculation
in particular is likely not large enough to justify the parallelization overhead. Potentially this could
be mitigated by classifying multiple packets at once, which would increase the size of the parallel
task. However, this will also impact performance, since the attack models will not be updated until
all the packets have been classified; if the parallel task size is too large, the packets will be classified




The feature set used does contain novel elements, in particular the treatment of the port for TCP and
UDP packets, but it is also not very large. Only having the packet header information does limit the
choice of features to some degree but there are significant features still available and unused.
Absolute Time Looking at the packet time may be a useful feature, intuitively if two packets are
very far packet in time it is less likely that they are produced by the same attack behavior.
Intensity over Time Looking at the packet timing relative to the start time of the attack or the inter-
arrival time of packets may also be a useful feature. Potentially this could separate behaviors
that act quickly without regard for detection from stealthy behaviors that spread the attack
in time to avoid detection. This feature may also be useful for diagnosing different regimes
within an attack, different steps in an attack behavior may exhibit different inter-arrival times.
TCP Flags Some denial of service behaviors intentionally depart from the typical TCP interaction
to exhaust the resources of a system. These attack behaviors can easily be identified by
including the TCP flags as a feature for TCP packets.
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Time-to-Live The time-to-live (TTL) value may also be a useful feature for discriminating different
attack behaviors, particularly if the hosts participating in the attack are in a similar location
and traverse a similar path through the Internet, or in the opposite case are dispersed like a
botnet. For example, Ohta et al. [14] suggests that the time-to-live value could be used for
diagnosing spoofed addresses of the same host. Of course, this value could also be “spoofed”,
by initializing it with a non-standard value, but even in that case a random appearance to the
TTL value may be a discriminating feature.
Weighting of Graphical Information
A final consideration, especially if the feature set is expanded, is the weight given to the graphical
information versus the packet-level information. Currently, the relationship between the packet-
level features, which is encapsulated by the likelihood term, and the graphical information present in
the prior is weighted equally: they are directly multiplied to produce the posterior. This is deliberate
to adhere to the normal Bayesian construction: imposing weightings adds an ad-hoc element that
debases the claim of a Bayesian construction.
However, if many packet-level features are included potentially this could distort the importance
of packet-level information relative to the graphical information. Even with the current feature
set, and the examples presented to exhibit the importance of the graphical prior probability in the
Results chapter, the balance between the graphical information and packet level information is not
considered explicitly. Additional effort could be expanded to verify if the packet-level information
has too much or too little influence relative to the graphical information.
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Probability Density Versus Probability
Together Equations 3.1 and 3.8 provide a methodology for estimating the probability density func-
tion for each feature, with discrete or continuous. In the context of estimating the posterior probabil-
ity the quantity of interest, however, is the probability of a particular feature value, p(x|M), not the
density fX|M (x). For a discrete feature, this discrepancy is not significant, though in the continuous
case it initially appears problematic. In general, certainly the probability density function value can
not be substituted for a probability value, aside from being incorrect, the density function values
may exceed one and are certainly non-zero for a continuous random variable.
However, the goal of the classification is determine in the most probable attack model; this is
a relative calculation, and this relative nature vindicates the method of calculating the probability
density. Equation A.2, can be validated by a simple proof, integrating the probability density func-
tion over an infinitesimally small region. Phrased colloquially, Equation A.2 states that the ratio of
probability densities is equivalent to, and can be used in place of, a ratio of probabilities.
lim
δ−>0
P (x1 ≤ X1 ≤ x1 + δ)




P (X1 = x1)





Phased more directly in the context of the attack model classification, letX be a random variable
representing a particular feature, and fX|Mi , be distribution of X under a particular attack model
Mi. If one of the attack models is held as a reference,MR, the probability of the other attack models
Mi, can be written in terms of the density and a scalar coefficient.
P (X = x|Mi) =
fX|Mi(x)
C where C =
fX|MR(x)
P (X = x|MR) (A.3)
When determining the maximum a posteriori attack model,
(argmaxMP (X|M)P (M)), C is invariant over the variable to be maximized and can be ignored.
The conclusion is simply that the value of the probability density function can be used in place of
the likelihood probability when calculating the maximum a posteriori attack model, given that the
intent is to compare the attack models relative to one another. This point is not purely pedantic;
if the ratio of probabilities densities between two distribution was not equivalent to the ratio of
probabilities, the framework implemented would certainly preclude the use of continuous features.
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Appendix B
List of Software Modules
attack model.py - A class representing an attack model; has the ability to store all samples asso-
ciated with this model. Has two child classes, an empirical attack model and a generic attack
model. Distributions on features are actually handled by a FeatureSet object.
attack player.py - The “middle-man” class that simulates incoming traffic by reading from a data
source: either MySQL database captures, log files, or Wireshark traffic captures.
classifier.py- Implements a Bayesian classifier for assigning traffic to the maximum a posteriori
attack model.
cli.py- A command line interface; controls the processing flow in command line mode.
crawler.py- Used for autonomous data collection over many targets of interest, randomly selects a
target, runs processing, then moves to the next.
edge.py- A class representing an edge in the attack social graph, it is aware of what packets occur
over this edge, and features of the traffic on this edge. An edge is also aware of the current
attack model.
empirical feature.py- A subclass of feature, represents a feature distribution created empirical by
observing traffic.
feature.py- A class representing a distribution over a particular feature. This is a histogram for
a discrete feature, and a kernel density estimator for a continuous feature; both are non-
parametric distributions, which estimate the probability of a new sample based on previous
samples.
feature factory.py- Singleton class for creating the feature distributions of an attack model. If a
new feature is added, this class must be updated so it is included in the attack models. This
is just a convenience class to assist when creating attack models. The singleton constraint is
applied as a decorator (http://wiki.python.org/moin/PythonDecorators).
feature functions.py- The module converts packet information into features, for the more complex
features at least. For example, the port randomness feature or graph position feature use a
feature function to convert the packet data into this more advanced feature.
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feature set.py- A class representing a set of features; an AttackModel class is a FeatureSet
at its core, and this set includes all the Feature objects defined.
generic feature.py- A subclass of feature, representing a feature distribution under the generic
model; a superclass for many subclasses, on for each feature, and defines the “jack-of-all-
trades” distributions defined for the feature.
gui.py – The main class for the graphical user interface, and the head of the observer responsibility
chain. This class organizes and places other user interface components.
gui edge frame.py- The graphical user interface frame that shows the edge likelihood information.
gui feature frame.py- The graphical user interface frame that shows the feature distributions, ac-
cessed by switching the top-most tab.
gui graph frame.py- The graphical user interface frame that shows the attack social graph.
gui packet frame.py- The graphical user interface frame showing the incoming packet informa-
tion; at the bottom of the user interface.
gui parameters.py- Singleton class specifying graphical user interface appearance parameters.
highly active detector- Class to detect “highly active” attack social graph elements, like in a dis-
tributed denial of service attack or fast scan. The processing needs a way to simplify these
cases or it becomes overloaded.
likelihood strategy.py- Strategy for calculating the feature likelihoods for a new sample under a
particular FeatureSet distribution. This class is used by the Classifier.
main.py – The main modules used to kick-off the processing.
model introduction strategy- Strategy for adding new models to the Attack Segmentation and
Model Generation processing. There are subclasses implemented different approaches, prin-
cipally iterative implementations to improve processing speed.
observer.py – An abstract class representing the “Observer” in the “Observer” design pattern.
orm classes.py- Classes defined for interacting with the MySQL ORM; these classes must exactly
mirror the tables in the MySQL database.
plot strategy.py- Classes for plotting the feature distribution, and controlling the formatting of the
plots on the feature display.
prior probability strategy.py- Class for calculating the prior probability based on the graph struc-
ture; there are a few subclass variations on this, principally iterative implementations to im-
prove processing speed. This class is used by the Classifier.
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processing controller.py- Head of the strategy responsibility chain; coordinates all of the process-
ing strategies and interacts with the AttackPlayer.
processing strategy.py- Module which actually performs the proposed processing; two subclasses
are implemented: one for the Segmentation and Model Generation method and another naı¨ve
method used for comparison.
responsibility chain.py- Abstract class that defines the public contract for classes under the re-
sponsibility chain pattern.
sample.py- Class representing a sample from a particular feature distribution.
sample set.py- A collection of samples; the feature vector analog of a packet.
segmentation strategy.py- Strategy for removing irrelevant components from the attack social
graph. In principle, the module removes components attributed to attack models not present
at the target of interest.
singleton.py- Abstract class representing the Singleton design pattern; applied as a decorator.
strategy factory.py- A convenience class for creating new processing strategies; it lumps together
all the individual strategies that make up a processing strategy.
subject.py- An abstract class representing the “Subject” in the “Observer” pattern.
